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 Participation in the crime of 
waging aggressive war is 
participation in organized murder 
carried on under the official 
auspices of the State waging such 
a war in violation of int. law. The 
aggressive character of the war 
serves to deprives it of all 
shadow of legality and there is no 
protection to the individual who 
engages in it with knowledge of 
its illegal or aggressive character. 
Similarly the law (both the 
 Charter & Countrol Law No. 10) 
seeks to reach the **** or stage 
at which the application of the 
sanction of criminality may 
operate as a deterrent. Planning 
or preparation of a war of 
aggression becomes likewise the 
planning and preparation for an 
organized series of crimes as the 
legal protection to the individual 
inherent in the old conception of 
international law has now been 
completely withdrawn. We may 
properly apply simple a simple 
analogy from the common law 
relative to murder to this altered 
situation. 
 It is well recognized that if an 
individual performs an act with 
knowledge that it will probably 
cause death or serious bodily 
harm it is no defense in a criminal 
prosecution to assert that there 
was no actual subjective intention 
to injure the victim. The actor 
may even wish the contrary. Thus 
a leading authority in American 
criminal law points out: 
"xxx if a man recklessly 
throws from the roof into a 
crowded 
 street a heavy piece of timber, 
which kills a person in the 
street, he is guilty of murder. 
So, if a person intentionally 
fires a pistol in a crowded 
street, and kills another, this is 
murder." (Miller on Criminal 
Law p 268) 
Criminal responsibility may flow 
from a general recklessness which 
disregards all consequences, if the 
circumstances are such that a 
reasonable man would have 
known the natural and probable 
consequences of the act. There is 
no sound reason to 
 deny vitality to that principle as 
applied to the facts of this case. 
Logic would require that, the 
more dangerous the 
instrumentality, the greater 
should be the degree of care 
society should exact of the 
individuals in regard thereto. *** 
Rearmament and mobilization of 
the war potential must in the 
interest of world security be 
definitely placed in this category. 
